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Abstract
Th is article is a personal account of an immigration judge 
in the UK.
Th e history of attitudes towards immigrants in the UK 
since the Edict of Nantes is briefl y sketched along with the 
sporadic emergence of review systems of executive decisions 
concerning immigrants, both political and non-political, 
from the beginning of the twentieth century up to the cur-
rent one introduced fi rst in 1969.
Th e article then looks at the sort of judges recruited at 
fi rst and the subject matter of most of the appeals until 
1993—visitors, students, overstayers, and those seeking 
settlement for work, for their families to join them, and for 
marriage.
Th e article deals briefl y with the development of the im-
migration law in this period through these sorts of cases and 
the issues and questions facing the judge at the time. It con-
siders where we got our information from with its challen-
ges and shortcomings: particularly the misunderstandings 
which arise in cross-cultural dialogue.
Th e paper deals with the diff erences between a tribunal 
system in this particular jurisdiction, which adopts an ad-
versarial approach, and the regular courts; and with the 
profound impact on a judge of having to adapt to decision 
making in such a milieu. It also tackles how these diff erences 
aff ect a judge’s approach, especially given the constraints im-
posed on his judicial independence.
It also deals with the apparent changes over the years in 
the attitudes of judges in the tribunal, leaving a question 
mark over how far they are infl uenced by events and public 
opinion.
Some of the perceived shortcomings of the tribunal sys-
tem to decide immigration matters are set out in the context 
of what Stephen Sedley described as a “fear of public abuse 
or political displeasure, unwittingly favouring individuals 
who fi t stereotypes with which I felt an affi  nity; aff ection 
(sympathy) or prejudice which may skew my judgment.”
Th e demons which lurk in all systems of adjudication, 
asylum prominent among them, are called out by name in 
the judicial oath and the hope is expressed that lessons have 
been learned both as a judge and a person in the course of 
some twenty-two years in this jurisdiction.
Résumé
Cet article est le compte rendu personnel d’un juge 
d’immigration au Royaume Uni.
L’article retrace les attitudes envers les immigrants au 
Royaume Uni depuis l’Édit de Nantes. Brièvement esquissé, 
l’article mentionne l’apparition sporadique de systèmes de 
revue de décisions exécutives concernant les immigrants, 
politiques et non-politiques, depuis le début du 20e siècle 
jusqu’au système actuel, introduit en 1969.
L’article examine ensuite les types de juges recrutés au dé-
but et l’objet de la plupart des appels jusqu’en 1993 : visiteurs, 
étudiants, ceux avec un séjour prolongé sans autorisation, 
et ceux avec des demandes d’établissement pour travailler, 
pour réunion familiale et pour cause de mariage.
L’article s’adresse sommairement au développement de la 
loi sur l’immigration pendant cette période à la faveur de 
ces cas, et des questions et problèmes confrontant le juge à 
cette époque. D’où provenait notre information, y compris 
les lacunes et les défi s qu’elle posait; tout particulièrement les 
malentendus nés de dialogues interculturels.
L’article examine ensuite les diff érences qui existent en-
tre un système axé sur le processus d’un tribunal, qui existe 
dans cette juridiction particulière — avec sa procédure con-
tradictoire — et les Cours régulières, et l’impact considérable 
sur un juge qui doit s’habituer à prendre des décisions dans 
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un tel environnement. Il touche aussi sur la façon dont ces 
diff érences infl uent sur l’approche d’un juge, spécialement en 
présence des contraintes imposées sur son indépendance.
Il aborde aussi le sujet de l’évolution apparente de 
l’attitude des juges dans les tribunaux, et pose la question 
de savoir jusqu’à quel point ils sont infl uencés par les événe-
ments et l’opinion publique.
Puis, l’article place quelques unes des faiblesses perçues de 
ce système (p. ex. le questionnement de sa capacité à pouvoir 
statuer sur des questions d’immigration) dans le contexte de 
ce qu’a dit Stephen Sedley, « la peur de l’opprobre publique 
ou du déplaisir politique, favorisant inconsciemment les in-
dividus qui cadrent avec les stéréotypes avec lesquels j’avais 
une affi  nité, de l’aff ection ou des préjugés qui peuvent infl é-
chir mon jugement ».
Les démons qui sont à l’aff ût dans tout système décision-
nel, le droit d’asile apparaissant en bonne place, sont appelés 
par leurs noms dans le serment judiciaire et le souhait est 
exprimé que des leçons ont été apprises, tant comme juge 
que comme simple citoyen, au cours des 22 années passées 
dans la juridiction.
Aft er 5 years trial the Aliens Act [1905] stands before the bar of 
public opinion anathemised almost by all, understood by few. 
[It is] suggested that the powers of Board be transferred to [a] 
court of summary jurisdiction—a Stipendiary Magistrate plus 2 
 assessors. A Memorial from the Jewish Board of Deputies states 
[inter alia] that there be an appeal to Kings Bench Division … 
and better interpretation. Th ough Winston Churchill agreed 
with the former he said it would have little utility—and 
nothing was done.1
There is no shortage of writings on immigration in general or judges in particular and as such this paper is not in competition with any of them but is simply 
a personal account of the experiences of one immigration 
judge.
Coming as I did from regular practice at the normal com-
mon law bar and bench I had had no conscious experience 
of immigration law. Nor had I ever given thought to the case 
of the migrant, whether voluntary or enforced, even though I 
myself migrated to Zambia where I practiced for over twenty 
years.2
Th e issues may be familiar to most readers but perhaps 
some of the angles may be new. However it is not just an ac-
count of the type of issues we all had to deal with, which I see 
to be the most important, it is how operating amidst those 
issues can, hopefully, have a character-building eff ect on the 
decision maker.
I begin with a little history, by way of setting the scene for 
the chosen method for reviewing decisions on immigration-
related matters by the executive.
Th e drive to be on the move for one reason or another, 
compulsory or voluntary, seems a part of man’s makeup. 
Whether it be to fi nd better pasture, to fl ee from an enemy 
or be taken captive, it has only become what we see as such a 
“problem” today with nation-states; and nation-states which 
are richer and nation-states which are poorer.
Generally England appears to have had no comprehensive 
policy of restriction on immigrants until 1905, though there 
had been an on-off  sort of approach since the revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes in 1685.
At fi rst the general feeling was one of compassion for refu-
gees and modern asylum really began there. Th ere was a pan-
ic reaction with the French Revolution and thereaft er, with 
the slide into insecurity all over again in 1870, with an “Act 
to authorize the Removal of Aliens from the Realm,” public 
reaction encouraged by the press has railed against “rising 
tides,’’ “fl oods,” and even “masses” of immigrants intent on 
harming our cosy (perhaps rosy) perception of the good life.
Th e rhetoric down the ages seems to portray a fear for na-
tional security, or for the integrity of one’s national bound-
aries, although one cannot help thinking that it is much more 
a reluctance to share the good life; but it generates increasing 
restrictions which rebound on everyone, friend and foe alike. 
It seems there is an inbuilt potential for hostility toward an 
alien, arising more oft en than not out of ignorance—or fear—
ignorance that all too frequently is fed by lack of informed 
facts and self-serving malign encouragement.
Th e introduction of any review whatsoever of decisions 
whether to admit or remove the foreigner was something of 
a revolution when fi rst introduced, in a rather basic way, in 
1905 to a tribunal,3 called the London Immigration Board, 
which generally sat in secret as a panel of three selected from 
a group appointed by the Home Secretary and who had 
magisterial, business, or administrative experience.4
Th e Board’s comprehension of asylum was worse than 
dangerous. Th ere was no further review even by the courts.5
In 1906 there were 935 people excluded and 796 appeals 
heard, of which 442 succeeded, and in 1910 there were 1,066 
excluded and 432 appeals, of which 144 succeeded.
Th e Sydney Street Siege in January 1910 led to an attack 
on the right of refuge and Stephen Phillips wrote, “Th e right 
to asylum is being shamefully violated.”6
Th e right of review was removed by the Aliens Restriction 
Act 19147 and there was no appeal against any immigration 
decision until a return of a system whereby the executive de-
cision concerning the immigrant could be reviewed8 by a tri-
bunal structure with the Immigration Appeals Act 1969.9 For 
better or for worse, the question what is the best-suited body 
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to deal with individual claims for recognition as a refugee 
has been answered in this country by establishing a judicial 
tribunal.
Th is was modifi ed in 1971 and has remained, with some 
changes since 2002, as the avenue for the review of almost all 
executive decisions of an immigration nature ever since.
It was not until 1979 when I became a part-time adjudi-
cator—the lowest step in the judicial hierarchy for immigra-
tion appeals—that I had my fi rst conscious encounter with 
immigration appeals. I say “conscious” because as a judge in 
Zambia I realized later that, as in India, judges can and do 
pay regard to the diff erent issues which sometimes arise in 
the case of non-nationals.
Coming to the system without any previous experience I, 
along with others like myself at the time, probably with past 
service abroad, learned “on the job,” the only training being 
attached for a few hearings to another adjudicator.
In the UK immigration appeals do not concern only refu-
gees.10 Indeed until the early 1990s they hardly ever did. Not 
only was there no appeal as such from a decision to refuse 
refugee status but there were few applications and fewer re-
fusals. Th e way in which an asylum issue arose before us was 
either on an appeal against a decision to deport the person or 
an in-country refusal of permission to extend a stay.
Most cases we had to deal with at the time involved visitor 
and student appeals, applications to set aside a deportation 
order, and long-term applications for settlement. Rarely, if 
ever, was the appellant present and yet it was his or her inten-
tions which primarily were in issue. Only the visa or entry 
clearance offi  cer in the mission abroad had the chance to see 
and hear the applicant and it was therefore only that view 
which was before us. Th e oral evidence was from the sponsor 
and, however truthful he may have been, he was not the one 
whose purpose in wanting to come was the question. When, 
as was the case at times, we allowed up to 25 per cent of the 
appeals, this caused much dissatisfaction in the missions and 
we heard all about it when we went on tour.
On one occasion my colleague hinted that he thought the 
adjudicator must have allowed an appeal because she was 
pretty and showed too much leg! Th ere could be no other 
good ground for appeal, let alone success, he asserted. We all 
knew but no one said that adjudicator was me.
Other appeals were from refusals of an extension of per-
mission to stay for one reason or another.
Th ere were the “tax fraud” cases and the “Primary Purpose” 
appeals. Th e appellants in these types of case usually came 
from the Indian subcontinent. Th ere were other issues which 
came up in appeals originating in the Caribbean or Africa.
Tax fraud arose when the sponsor, usually a man, had, on 
arrival, claimed either to be single and to have had no, or 
some particular number of, children. He would then later 
claim tax allowances for diff erent family members and, when 
he was well settled, years later, he would apply to bring in 
a wife and children he could never have had if his original 
story had been true.
Th ere was no data link between immigration and tax so 
it would not be picked up until the immigration application 
was made.
Years of deception did not necessarily mean he was not 
married or even that the children were his. Th ey were oft en 
those of a sibling. It tested our skills at deciding credibility, 
oft en with less than adequate examination skills by repre-
sentatives and—being a judicial tribunal—limited rights for 
the adjudicator to act as examining magistrate. As DNA was 
later to show, in all probability we had been getting decisions 
wrong as to who was and who was not related to the resident 
spouse.
Th e latter cases of Primary Purpose arose out of claims to 
join a new or would-be spouse. Th e applicant had to prove 
a negative: that it was not the primary purpose of the ap-
plication to gain residence in the UK. Endless appeals to the 
courts arose and it took us years to get what we thought to 
be the right approach—even if the outcomes may have been 
questionable with tools of doubtful value. Th e misery caused 
when we were wrong hardly bears thinking about.
When the immigration appeals started in 1969 it was 
thought that the immigration judges needed exposure to 
some of the cultures and countries of the peoples whose ap-
peals would come before them, even though many at the 
time had served abroad as judges, magistrates, or law offi  -
cers. Th us, every two years or so, two adjudicators would be 
sent off  for a few weeks to diff erent regions of the world to 
learn what went on.
In 1988 along with Lady Elizabeth Anson we spent a 
month in the Middle East, Bangladesh, Th ailand, and the 
Indian subcontinent, right up to Landikotl in the northwest 
frontier and the Afghani border, through what was then a 
place where you could buy anything from a Parker pen to 
a washing machine—or an AK47, probably taken from the 
Russians who were at that very moment departing to the 
north. We were fortunate to be able to see and talk to the 
people, more of them than had many of our colleagues be-
fore, since we had been there before and knew many people. 
But we still missed many of the warning signals of troubles 
to come.
We also, along with others, failed to take on board fully 
the diffi  culties of learning things upon which we either could 
not rely in hearings or would have diffi  culties if we did.
We all learned something of the customs of people whose 
countries we visited, from Sylheti in Bangladesh or Sikhs 
from the Punjab, but it was all too brief to assimilate any deep 
understanding. Th ere was always much we did not know (and 
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worse still did not realize we did not know) which made the 
formulation of opinions about the truth of a witness or the 
plausibility of a story always diffi  cult and invariably suspect.
Th e extent of cross-cultural misunderstandings was not 
grasped and even now it taints the decisions of immigration 
judges on perceptions of risk in asylum appeals and the real 
conditions prevailing in mother countries. Unfortunately the 
judge tends to be suspicious of the value of the anthropolo-
gist’s expert opinion which can educate him or her out of the 
distortion caused by their own cultural perceptions. Even the 
cultural relativity of telling lies is not well understood.
Th e use of one’s own knowledge in an adversarial straight-
jacket has been the subject of debate for years, especially 
knowledge arising out of the tours abroad; but even with in-
terpreters I have found, when seconded to assist in the back-
log of appeals in South Africa, where that constraint was ab-
sent their knowledge was invaluable in deciding whether the 
appellant came from one side of a political boundary or the 
other.11
Th e need to have an encyclopedic knowledge of cultures 
and country backgrounds, and even more importantly an 
open mind as to how the latter can impact in individual cases 
and the former can give a consciousness of the inherent elu-
siveness of any certainty, is another major diff erence. Th is is 
so especially in the extent to which one may be required to be 
more proactive than in a normal court.
Where the adversarial type of tribunal failed miserably 
was to enable us to protect the reluctant (almost invariably 
vulnerable female) spouse who was forced to agree to marry 
someone she did not want to marry. We tried to persuade the 
Indian community in Baroda and the High Commissioner in 
London as long ago as 1988 to take up the matter—but noth-
ing was done and it is still as much an issue today as it was 
then.12 I know of one case at least where we got it wrong and 
the girl was murdered.
Th e caseloads of asylum—and later human rights relat-
ed—appeals overtook those of the non-asylum appeals in-
creasingly from 1993. Th ese started to hit the immigration 
appeals system a year or two before when just two of us dealt 
with the majority of appeals which had an asylum content.
Recently numbers of asylum appeals as such have decreased 
but appeals under the European Convention on Human 
Rights have increased. But it was in 1993 that a separate right 
of appeal was created.
I was then appointed as Deputy Chief Adjudicator. I had 
the responsibility for organizing the disposal of asylum ap-
peals. Th e logistical task was made more complex than it 
should have been by the inability of the Home Offi  ce to pre-
dict numbers or to be willing to release appeals in some sort 
of orderly fashion. Added to this was the refusal to trust the 
appellate authorities to organize the most effi  cient way of 
fi ltering unmeritorious appeals swift ly and economically—
managing without the vast increases in resources which are 
now in place.13
Th e adversarial system applied in this jurisdiction—more 
than, say, in the social welfare appeals, on which tribunal I 
also sat for nearly ten years—grew for two reasons. Firstly 
the people who were appointed at the time were lawyers and 
familiar with an adversarial system and secondly the tribunal 
system, although it occupies a place of its own in the UK ad-
ministrative system, is still placed in a judicial hierarchy, as it 
were, and decisions are reviewed by the courts. Th is became 
increasingly the case when a specifi c right of appeal was add-
ed from the appellate part of the immigration appeals system 
to the Court of Appeal.
We have seen how important such a review is, but at the 
same time it reinforces the judicialization of the tribunal and 
has limited all attempts to loosen the straightjacket.
I have said that decision making in immigration appeals 
is diff erent from decision making in the ordinary course of 
head-to-head litigation—either civil or criminal in the regu-
lar courts—and even, but to a lesser extent, in other tribu-
nals.14 I will deal with some of the factors which have a pro-
found infl uence on decisions a judge can, or should be able 
to, live with.
Th ese factors fall broadly into two groups. Matters of law 
fall into the fi rst group. But it is not only the laws themselves 
which concern me. Th e fi rst contention to be overcome was 
what immigration law comprises. Some judges would have 
excluded European Community Law as well as any other 
domestic law which was not designedly immigration. Th ere 
was protracted debate on who has to prove what, and when 
and to what extent, and it had to be settled whether the same 
rule applied to asylum cases and any other case, and at what 
date the facts themselves were to be looked at. Was it to be 
when the original decision was made by the state or was it 
each time there was a hearing of the appeal?
When it came to interpretation of the law, particularly the 
immigration rules themselves, the tendency in earlier days 
was to adopt a facilitative or generous interpretation of the 
immigration rules, and rarely was the literal wording deci-
sive. Th e rules were looked at as rules by which to decide how 
someone may be admitted to a country rather than how they 
can be kept out. Th e latter was the Home Offi  ce approach, 
sometimes with markedly diff erent results.
Partly to do with this, and partly due to a lack of under-
standing of local cultures, it was to the despair of local 
Caribbean society, who gave voice to what they perceived to 
be incomprehensible unfairness in the rules in the way we de-
cided whether a parent had had the “sole responsibility” for 
the upbringing of a child who had been left  behind until the 
parent had settled in the UK and was in the position to off er 
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them a home with them. In such cases the social and legal 
position of illegitimate children in the rules caused mon-
strous injustice, it was said. Even the local social workers were 
baffl  ed why children should be admitted to the UK only if the 
parent had had sole responsibility for them: “It is as illogical 
as admitting the child on the size of his feet!” they said.
How the law is interpreted is especially important with 
human rights related appeals. We regarded the Refugee 
Convention as a living instrument that was set in place for 
the purpose of aff ording a substitute for the protection which 
the claimant’s own country should have given but did not. 
Th is approach, when brought together with the extent of 
the “burden of proof ” resting on the refugee claimant, did 
not admit of a literalist approach. As an example there were 
many cases in which it was accepted that economics could be 
a basis of persecution.15
Unlike today.
Th e extent of the family aff ected by removal under Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been 
restrictively interpreted by the Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal (AIT) and it had to be the House of Lords which 
corrected this.16 I along with others in the UK and France 
had accepted that the threat of FGM (female genital mutila-
tion) could amount to persecution but both the AIT and the 
Court of Appeal departed from this and again it was left  to 
the House of Lords, in uncompromising language, to restore 
that approach.17
Again when it came to the exclusion from refugee status, 
decisions by the AIT have adopted a literalist interpretation to 
Article 4F of the Refugee Convention 1951 in a manner leading 
it to conclude that there is no room for evidence that someone 
who has ever committed acts which could lead to exclusion 
has reformed. No proof of a change of heart can prevail.18
Yet again I certainly accepted that no one who was ordered 
to carry out an action which amounted to crimes against hu-
manity was obliged to carry out such an order. In that case it 
was as I recall carpet bombing in civilian (Kurdish) areas by 
the Turkish army. However the AIT has more recently held 
otherwise. It was put right by the Court of Appeal.19
To the second group belong everything relating to fact 
fi nding. One of the major points of diff erence between the 
regular courts, at least in serious matters of crime and some 
civil actions, is that the judge does not sit alone. Either there 
are other judges with him or her, or there is a jury, or in some 
cases assessors. Adjudicators and immigration judges, how-
ever, sit entirely on their own.
Th e judge is faced with any of one or more dilemmas: how 
best to make a judgment on the plausibility of a story and 
credibility itself; evaluating expert, documentary, and other 
evidence; knowing when and how to use his or her own 
knowledge and experience; and knowing how and when he 
should intervene, usually when there is no or no adequate 
representation.
In general terms, various authors have proposed some 
sort of guidelines to help with credibility, such as cultural 
and language fi lters; contamination of memory theories; 
vulnerability; consistency; verifi able country backgrounds; 
and—questionably—demeanour.
But two matters, perhaps more than anything else, have 
contributed to a real risk of a wrong decision, or the lack of 
transparency in many. Th e fi rst is that most decisions by a 
single immigration judge turn on fact, and fact-fi nding is his 
or her weak point. It is also one on which any or any adequate 
training is not given. Th e second is the requirement that an 
appeal can be made based on an error of law only—and this 
is strictly interpreted.
Experienced judges are unanimous that picking out the 
liar is diffi  cult. Whether or not it is a skill which can be learn-
ed must be open to much doubt but what is clear is that it is a 
quicksand to be wary of, which is a good reason for adopting 
the Canadian approach—if the story hangs together the ap-
pellant should not readily be branded a liar.
Relegating credibility to second place makes it less likely 
for a decision maker to adopt the view that an adverse cred-
ibility fi nding leads inevitably to the appeal being rejected. 
A test of “apparent reasonableness” or even common sense 
takes one no further since the question remains of “apparent 
to whom?”, “common to whose sense?”
To say that credible statements must be coherent and 
plausible and not run counter to generally known facts20 
arguably begs the questions of how to assess plausibility and 
which facts are generally known facts.21
Geertz suggests it is a cultural system resting on a convic-
tion of its validity.22 But how well qualifi ed is that person to 
assess what is reasonable in the circumstances? Lee J. in the 
Federal Court of Canada23 asks, “how are we to separate sys-
temic injustices from individual prejudices?”
Credibility is neither an aim itself nor some sort of points 
system of analysis.24 As Regina Graycar puts it, “Credibility 
is not itself a valid end to the function of an adjudicator.” 
Courts all over the English-speaking world have struggled to 
fi nd a formula to guide the over- or under-credulous, and to 
counsel caution in being too ready to reject a story.25
Th e approach to accepting the scenario presented has its 
own special problems, not the least being that it is usually 
presented through an interpreter. Given that there are no 
strict rules for guidance, the judge is thrown back on his own 
resources, which may be biased, oft en unknowingly. Or he 
may rely on information which has been gained by experi-
ence and absorbed as the truth,26 for example that documen-
tary evidence from some countries is inherently unreliable, 
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or the confi guration of an airport in some remoter part of 
the world.
Again, with expert evidence one is oft en lacking any reli-
able yardstick and ends up overemphasizing the role of ul-
timate control over the decision-making process, falling back 
on civil or criminal rules and guidelines.27
For myself, adapting to the hybrid nature of an appellate 
system, although itself founded in an adversarial climate with 
adversarially trained lawyers, was a little easier having sat as 
a judge in a country which had no jury system and in which 
the quality of representation was not always good and one 
was nearly always working through at least one interpreter.
But for those used to this, and with the increasing super-
vision from superior courts, the degree of acceptable inter-
vention and the way of introducing one’s own knowledge was 
much less easy.
In sum, in my view, for these reasons alone a legalistic tri-
bunal is unsuited to the sort of inquiry called for particularly 
in refugee appeals. Unfortunately the confrontational nature 
of this type of enquiry starts with the Home Offi  ce and has 
contributed greatly to the perception of racist and discrimin-
atory decision making by it.
Very marked inroads into judicial independence are much 
more easily made to a tribunal created by statute. Th is has 
been done both by the rules and procedures themselves and 
by pressures brought about partly by the high profi le nature 
of the subject matter and partly internally by production line 
techniques and pressures to reach a decision quickly. Bound 
up with the last factor of the high profi le nature of immi-
gration is the constant exposure to stories of human rights 
abuses which can have psychological consequences for the 
judge, and can lead to forms of judicial burnout—something 
one does not always see in oneself or those around you—
until one steps outside.
In Poland at least decisions are overseen by the Supreme 
Administrative Court which is not open to the sort of interfer-
ence by the executive which is found constantly in the UK.
A start can be made on the attitudes and prejudices of the 
judge with what Lord Justice Sedley told an international 
conference of immigration judges:
Every one of these nouns is set in high relief by the asylum 
judge’s functions. Th e fear of public abuse or political displeas-
ure, even if neither can result in dismissal; the risk of unwittingly 
favouring individuals who fi t stereotypes with which the judge 
feels an affi  nity; the risk that aff ection—sympathy—will skew 
judgment; the risk that ill will—prejudice—may do the same; 
the judicial oath calls out by name these demons which lurk in 
all systems of adjudication, asylum prominent among them. I 
do not suggest that there is any nostrum against these things, 
though by being aware that they exist is an important start.28
One asks, can experience and training make a “ … good 
road builder”? Th e answer is, perhaps; but under certain con-
ditions.
Th e judge must listen to the evidence, make fi ndings of fact, 
and apply the law. Straightforward enough, it would seem, at 
least to someone brought up in the common law traditions 
before adversarial courts. In the immigration hearings how-
ever the issues involved and the way resolution question be-
fore the tribunal is to be resolved are diff erent: the absence 
of strict rules of evidence; the opportunity to hear what the 
party has to say fi rst hand; the lack of cultural understanding 
of many and varied appellants; not to mention the unlikeli-
hood of having been exposed to immigration at fi rst hand, 
let alone to have been a refugee, categorized as a terrorist, or 
tortured. Perhaps Judge Albie Sachs from South Africa is one 
of the very few who has experienced the lot.
Th ere is oft en little to guide the judge but his experience—
in another sphere. Especially in asylum appeals his duty is to 
reach the truth—not merely on the evidence; and yet he is 
not an examining magistrate and does not have the facilities 
to call evidence even if he knew how to do so.
If he intervenes too obviously or relies on his own know-
ledge he is likely to be overturned on appeal. But time and 
again it is obvious that investigation is incomplete at best.
Some supporting evidence, such as expert evidence, may 
call for its own separate evaluation before putting it into the 
credibility equation.
Judges regularly seem to perceive threats to their own role 
in expert evidence from psychiatrists and anthropologists; 
but do they need to?
Th e attitude of the judge verging on the arrogant is no-
where more apparent than when it comes to dealing with 
medical or country background, and especially with psychi-
atric evidence. His expertise is in most cases at best limited 
and yet he is quick to assert that the decision is his. So it is—
but the attitude tends to be used to exclude any recognition 
that the opinion of such experts can be helpful and may be 
more reliable than his own. At the end of the day he just has 
to take responsibility whatever he does.
Th ere is no such thing as the state having to prove the 
correctness of their case that he is not a refugee, beyond all 
reasonable doubt; it is for the would-be refugee to show it 
is reasonably likely that if returned he may be persecuted. 
But along the road the dice are loaded and no more so than 
that his case is before a tribunal which can be manipulated at 
will, from both within the system and without, if it makes too 
many unacceptable decisions.
I do not make decisions in court or hearing room any 
longer. But if I did, would I be any better at it for the experi-
ences which I have had? We will never know.
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What has been the most profound impact on me has been 
to realize just how dangerous a job sitting in judgment is. 
Dangerous to the individual whose case I get wrong and dan-
gerous to myself if, as Stephen Sedley said, “fear of public 
abuse or political displeasure, unwittingly favouring individ-
uals who fi t stereotypes with which I felt an affi  nity; aff ection 
(sympathy) or prejudice which may skew my judgment.”
Th e judicial oath does indeed call out by name these 
demons which lurk in all systems of adjudication, asylum 
prominent among them. I hope it has taught me to be con-
stantly on the lookout for where I may have gone wrong and 
correct the error at the fi rst opportunity.
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